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Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts
In Robinson v. California the Supreme Court gave its blessing to
the humane view that narcotic addiction is an illness, not a crime. The
Court found that a California statute which made the status of addiction
a criminal offense imposed a "cruel and unusual punishment." How-
ever grave the menace which addicts may pose to society, it is uncon-
stitutional under Robinson to put a man in jail for being an addict.2
But it is permissible, wrote Mr. Justice Stewart, to protect the public
by putting him in a hospital for treatment instead.3
Taking their cue in part from this dictum, California and New York
have enacted sweeping programs providing for involuntary civil com-
mitment of narcotic addicts.4 Under these programs, any person is
subject to prolonged confinement and compulsory treatment on a
finding that he is addicted or in imminent danger of becoming addicted
to narcotic drugs.5 The commitment proceedings, which may be initi-
1. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. In this Court counsel for the State recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness
. We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal...
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Id. at 667.
3. In the interest of discouraging the violations of [laws prohibiting the unauthorized
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics] . . . , or In the
interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants, a State might establish a
program of compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of
treatment might require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal sanctions
might be imposed for failure to comply with established compulsory treatment proce.
dures.
Id. at 664-65 (dictum).
4. CAL. WELFARE & INsT'NS CODE §§ 3000-09, 8050-54, 3100-10, 3150-53, 3200-01, 3300-05
(West 1966); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §§ 200-12, as amended, (McKinney Supp, 1966).
The California program is in fact a revised and expanded version of a commitment scheme
originally enacted in 1961, a year before the Robinson decision. Ch. 850 §§ 2, 3 [1961] CAL.
STAT. New York has provided for civil commitment of addicts under arrest for the com-
mission of crimes since 1962. Ch. 204, [1962] Laws of N.Y. 957. Its new comprehensive pro-
gram was enacted in 1966, to take full effect in April, 1967.
5. The New York statute defines "narcotic addict" to include not only "a person who is
at the time of examination dependent upon [narcotic drugs] .. ." but also one "who by
reason of the repeated use of any such drug is in imminent danger of becomin dependent
upon [them] .... N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 201(2), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1966). California defines a narcotic addict as "any person . . . who is addicted to the un-
lawful use of any narcotic . . . except marijuana," CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CoDE § 3007
(West 1966), but provides for commitment of both addicts and persons who are "in imml.
nent danger of addiction." § 3106. This specific commitment section does not expressly re-
quire a finding of imminent danger by reason of repeated use, but that limitation Is In.
cluded among the allegations necessary for a valid petition for commitment under § 3100.
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ated by private citizens as well as public officials,0 are fully adversary.
The respondent has a right to notice, to a judicial hearing, to appointed
counsel in case of need, and to jury review of an adverse finding.7 Once
the requisite state of addiction or imminent addiction has been estab-
lished, however, the addict is summarily committed to the custody of a
narcotic commission for hospitalization, subsequent supervised out-
patient treatment, and re-hospitalization if necessary.8 In principle,
commitment continues until the addict is rehabilitated. The com-
mission is obliged to discharge him after three years in New York0
and after a maximum of ten years in California,10 but these limitations
appear to be largely illusory: if he is still addicted or if he becomes
addicted again, a new petition and a new hearing will send him back
to the commission for another round."'
It is also necessary for commitment of persons convicted of a crime under § 8051. Its
omission from § 3106 is almost certainly not to be construed to authorize commitment
of persons thought to be in imminent danger of addiction unless they have repeatedly
used narcotic drugs.
The California Supreme Court struggled bravely to avoid defining both "addiction" and
"imminent danger of addiction." In In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 153, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489,
505, 378 P.2d 793, 809, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963), it said that both phrases were non-
technical terms which "have a commonly understood meaning." In People v. Victor, 62
Cal. 2d 280, 301-02, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 212-13, 398 P.2d 391, 40--05 (1965), the court em-
phasized that addiction was a process, not an event, involving emotional dependence,
physical tolerance, and physical dependence, but it abjured any "single definition...
satisfactory for all purposes." Imminent danger of addiction, it said, is a point in the
process at which a repeated user of drugs "is in imminent danger-in the commonse-me
meaning of that phrase . . . -of becoming emotionally or physically dependent on their
use." Id. at 305, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 215, 398 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). It thus implied that
addiction could be found if there were either physical or emotional dependence alone. The
opinion of the court notwithstanding, however, both these terms-and espedally the whole
concept of imminent danger of addiction-may raise questions of excessive vagueness under
due process.
6. CAL. VELFARE & INsr'Ns CODE § 3100 (West 1966); N.Y. MEN-rAL HYGIENE LAW
§ 206(2)(a), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1966).
7. CAL. WELFARE & INsr'Ns CODE §§ 3103, 3105, 3108 (West 1966); N.Y. ME !NTAL HYcIEN
LAw § 206(2), (4), (7), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1966).
8. CAL WELFARE & Isr'xs CODE §§ 3106, 3150-53 (West 1966); N.Y. MTrAL YGImENE
LAw § 206(4)(b), (c), as amended, § 212 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
9. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 206(5), as amenTed, (fcKinney Supp. 1986).
10. CAL. VEIFARE & INSrNS CODE §§ 3200-01 (West 1966). The California release provi-
sions are complex. An addict must be hospitalized for at least six months. After that, if he
has sufficiently recovered, he may be released into outpatient care. Id. § 3151. He cannot
be discharged, however, until he has successfully completed three additional years without
use of narcotics as a supervised outpatient, subject to the 10-year maximum. Id. § 3200.
Indeed, he must be discharged from the hospital (if he is still there) or from outpatient
status after seven years of commitment unless it appears that, if not discharged, he may be
able to complete three supervised, unnarcotized years. Id. § 3201.
11. California admits this unblushingly:
Nothing in this chapter shall preclude a person who has been discharged from the
program from being recommitted under the program, irrespective of the periods of
time of any previous commitments.
CAL. WUEFAnm & INsr'xs CODE § 3201 (West 1966).
The New York statute is silent on recommitment. However, by its terms any person found
to be an addict is to be committed, and addicts who have previously been committed ap-
pear unmistakably to qualify.
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Civil commitment thus provides an antiseptic way of doing thor-
oughly what the criminal law cannot do at all. Prolonged incarceration
of the sick, barbaric when called "punishment," is now dressed respect-
ably as a form of "treatment." Unfortunately, this humane therapeutic
gloss on confinement of addicts is marred by a very poor prognosis.
While physical dependence on drugs can be relieved in a matter of
days, the psychological propensity to addiction is at least as intractable
as any other personality disorder. Moreover the roots of addiction are
commonly environmental as well as psychological, and a permanent
cure accordingly requires both mental and social rehabilitation of the
addict.12 The new programs are the first to attempt this dual form of
treatment on any large scale, and on this ground they hope to succeed
where previous efforts have notoriously failed. 13 But it remains at best
doubtful that either institutional therapy or limited occupational
training and after-care on limited budgets will be adequate to the task.
"[I]t is still only a minority of addicts who are known to benefit from
treatment."14 And even for that minority, "benefit" does not assure
permanent cure.15
12. The crucial problem in the treatment of addicts will continue to be how to effect
their rehabilitation into the community ....
Before and during addiction there was an absence of steady employment and stable
family relationships; the objective disabilities associated with his racial, ethnic, and
social class affiliations remain, and he has become enmeshed in a subculture which
glorifies cynicism, kicks, and hustling while the square values of work, family respon-
sibility, and respect for property and law are denigrated. The rehabilitation of addicts
and the prevention of addiction may never be possible while the focus is on drug use
alone; they may require a community approach with simultaneous efforts to provide
employment, adequate housing and psychiatric treatment and to reduce racial and
ethnic discrimination.
J. O'DONNELL 8- J. BALL, NARconc ADDICTION 179 (1966).
13. The conventional view has been well summarized in Ploscowe, Some Basic Problems
in Drug Addiction and Suggestions for Research, in JOINT CommrrrEE o r ATi ERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOCIATION ON NARCOTIC DRUGs, DRUG AD-
DICTION: CRIME OR DIsEAsE? 15, 88 (Interim Report) (1961):
[T]he exposure of a few months to a minimum amount of psychiatry, social case
work, educational and vocational activity, cannot eradicate the deep seated necessity
and compulsion for drugs which most addicts seem to have. There are no magic cures
at narcotics hospitals. We simply do not know enough about the process of drug
addiction to produce such cures.
The statistics on relapse to addiction after attempted cures at narcotics hospitals like
Lexington, Fort Worth or Riverside tell the stark story of the basic failure of the hos-
pital centered approach in dealing with problems of drug addiction.
Both new programs envision longer confinement, half-way houses to mitigate the effects
of reentry into the community, and efforts to train the addict in new skills and even to help
him find employment.
14. J. O'DONNELL & J. BALL, supra note 12, at 178. The full statement is:
There has . . . been some basis for hope in recent experiments with treatment. But
it is still only a minority of addicts who are known to benefit from treatment, so the
search for new ideas continues.
The "basis for hope" is the limited success New York and a few other states have had with
treatment of criminal addicts while under sentence, coupled with parole supervision over
subsequent drug use.
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Thus, the new programs confront addicts with the real prospect of
lifetime subjection to state supervision, punctuated by prolonged
periods of complete confinement.'0 They provide scrupulous procedural
protection, but their substance demands constitutional scrutiny as well.
Even if it is not punishment within the meaning of the eighth amend-
The combination of some degree of legal control over addicts, together with a treat-
ment program to help him find a satisfactory role in society, seems to have been the
most effective treatment yet devised.
Id. 177. This approach has also received the endorsement of the President's Advisory
Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse. JoINr Comxr =Tr OF -tmE A..,EtrCAn BAR AssoCIA-
TION AND THE AmEmcA. MxmcAr AssociTrioN (Final Report), supra note 13. Yet not
enough time has elapsed to evaluate finally the results of any of these programs, for
[r]elapse to the use of drugs seems to be an integral part of the addiction syndrome.
... The addict is likely to return to the use of drugs if his original motives for taking
drugs ... are not changed and he returns to the same environment.
Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 LAw & CaOXi.,. Pnou. 9, 24 (1957).
The mere deterrence of an addict from the use of drugs for a time does not constitute a
permanent cure.
The most hopeful results have in fact come from programs whose operating principles
seem to be inconsistent with involuntary treatment. Synanon, Daytop Lodge, and the pro-
gram being developed by New York City's Narcotics Coordinator Dr. Efren Ramirez, all
rely on the determination of the addict to cure himself. They employ reformed addicts
(who are in short supply) to persuade addicts to enter the programs, and the) rely on the
pervasive pressure of a community dedicated single-mindedly to abstention from drugs to
bring about a character transformation. See Ramirez, A Coinprehensh,e Plan for the Man-
agement of the Addiction Problem in New York City Based on the Puerto Rican Experi.
ence (unpublished paper prepared for the Puerto Rican Conference, New York City, April
15-16, 1967); Shelly & Bassin, Daytop Lodge-A New Treatment Approach for Drug Ad-
dicts, 11 CoRuxcrrvE PsYcHrAiY 186 (1965); Volkman & Cressey, Differential Association
and the Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts, 69 Alf. J. OF SOC. 129 (1963).
New York State has contracted with the Ramirez program to undertake treatment of some
of the addicts committed under the new law. But it is doubtful-albeit not impossible-
that an addict who is forced into such a program against his will, will respond to the kind
of treatment offered. Indeed, the most that the director of the state program claims for the
law is that it "provides a compulsory setting" which removes the addict from the addict
community and its influences. "'But we still have to find the means to get him to partid-
pate voluntarily in the program,' he added. 'We can't force him to take treatment.," N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1966, at 1, col. 7. Similarly, the New York Academy of Medicine has con-
cluded that:
The mental and emotional fixations [of addiction] ... are to be overcome only
through the individual's own efforts and desires. Psychotherapy cannot be forced upon
him with any hope of lasting benefit.
Committee on Public Health, Subcommittee on Drug Addiction, Report on Drug Addic-
tion, 31 Bur.. OF N.Y. Ac.AD. OF MEn. 392 (1955), in J. O'DoNNEU. & J. BALL, supra note 12,
at 190.
15. Indeed, Synanon does not believe that it can generally "cure" addiction, so that
former addicts can "stay clean" without its help.
The leaders have.., used a theory of rehabilitation that implies that it is as ridicu-
lous to try to "cure" a man of drug addiction as it is to try to "cure" him of sexual
intercourse.
Its aim is simply to help addicts to stay away from drugs, which it does primarily by en-
couraging them to remain in the religiously anti-drug community. Volkman & Cressey,
supra note 14, at 142.
16. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. Even if cure is ultimately effected, addicts
face certain confinement for a minimum of six months in California. Under a voluntary
program, Dr. Ramirez envisages complete confinement for a year as essential to successful
treatment. See Ramirez, supra note 14, at 11.
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ment, civil commitment-of narcotic addicts raises serious questions of
substantive due process.
The New Programs and the Existing Law of Civil Commitment
Civil confinement of addicts and drug users is by no means a new
idea. Besides New York and California, thirty-two states and the
District of Columbia authorize some such commitments. 17 But in
practice these older statutes have been largely dead letters for want of
treatment facilities.' 8 The new programs patently mean business.10
Unlike their predecessors, they make commitment mandatory once
addiction or imminent addiction has been established: all their pro-
cedural safeguards are directed only against the possibility of a mistaken
finding of addiction.20 For the first time, state governments are seriously
pursuing civil commitment as a solution to the narcotics problem.
Since there have been so few commitments, the case law on commit-
ment of addicts is sparse. No case directly assesses the constitutionality
of such commitments under the due process clause. 2' There are, how-
17. See F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTRYE, TnE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 87-88, table
I1-K (1961) for statutes in force in 1961. See also HAWAII REv. LAWs §§ 52-50 to 52-61 (1955).
18. 111 U. PA. L. REV. 122, 124 n.15 (1962); F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYPX, supra note 17,
at 19 nA8.
19. The New York program was enacted in response to an urgent executive request
"To Make New York State the Safest Place To Live" by confining the principal perpetrators
of crimes in New York City. See Rockefeller, Annual Message to the Legislature, 189th Sess.,
Jan. 5, 1966, reprinted in [1966] 2 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. 2975.
Moreover, in view of the provisions in both programs which permit any citizen to Initiate
commitment proceedings, supra note 6, not even the possibility of executive discretion In
enforcement would provide any guarantee against widespread commitment: the programs
are to this extent self-enforcing.
20. Under the new programs, once the respondent has been found to be an addict, the
judge has no choice but to commit him.
If, from the facts ascertained .... the judge or justice shall determine that ...
[a] person is a narcotic addict, he shall grant an order certifying such person to the
care and custody of the commission for the period provided ... ." N.Y. MrNTAL
HYGmNE LAw § 206(4)(c), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1966) (emphasis added).
At the hearing the court shall determine whether the person is addicted to the use
of narcotics or in imminent danger of addiction . . . . If the issue is determined in
the affirmative, the court shall order the person committed to the custody of the Direc-
tor of Corrections . ." CAL. WELFARE & INsr'Ns CODE § 3106 (emphasis added).
Cf. D.C. CODE § 24-608 (1961): "If the court finds the patient to be a drug user, It may
commit him to a hospital .... " (emphasis added).
21. The California Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the California
program against a challenge that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Citing
Robinson v. California, 870 U.S. 660 (1962), that court found the issue to be
whether the statutory scheme here challenged (a) imprisons petitioner "as a criminal,"
or (b) constitutes "compulsory treatment" of petitioner as a sick person requiring
"periods of involuntary confinement." If the former it would be unconstitutional under
Robinson as cruel and unusual punishment [citations omitted]; if the latter, it would
be valid under the same decision as a constitutionally permissible exercise of the state's
power to regulate the narcotic drug traffic.
In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 136, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 494, 378 P.2d 793, 798, cert. denied,
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ever, four old cases22 involving alcoholics confined under statutes
providing for involuntary commitments of "inebriate persons'---a
statutory category which includes drug addicts as well as drunkards.
These cases uniformly recognize the constitutionality of commitment
of some, but not all chronic alcoholics, by analogy to the state's power
to commit the mentally ill. They say that inebriate persons, like the
insane, may be committed if they have lost their powers of self-control
to such an extent that they are dangerous to themselves or others, are
in need of care or treatment, or are in a broad sense incapable of manag-
ing their affairs. But with one exception -3 the cases also say that due
process forbids commitment on grounds of habitual drunkenness
alone.
24
Yet these cases suggest no standards for determining how dangerous
either to himself or others, or how unable to care for himself or his
property, an inebriate person must be before he can be committed.
Plainly, a power with the drastic consequences of civil commitment
does have some substantive limits. Yet the constitutional case law on
commitment of the mentally ill does surprisingly little to tell us what
they are. The state courts initially decided to their satisfaction that
374 U.S. 856 (1963). In short, the court treated the Robinson dictum, supra note 2, as dis.
positive of the due process issue.
22. In re Hinkle, 33 Idaho 605, 196 P. 1035 (1921); Leavitt %. City of Morris, 105 Minn.
170, 117 N.W. 39 (1908); In re Schwarting, 76 Neb. 773, 108 N.V. 125 (1906); State ex rel.
Larkin v. Ryan, 70 Wis. 676, 36 N.W. 823 (1888). The precise nature of petitioner's inebri-
acy in Hinkle is not clear from the opinion. He may have been an addict, but in Idaho the
odds are he was an alcoholic.
23. In re Hinkle, 33 Idaho 605, 196 P. 1035 (1921), upheld, without reference to limita-
tions or to the facts of the case, a commitment under a statute which applied to persons
"so far addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants as to have lost the powrer
of self-control, or . . . subject to dipsomania or inebriety." Id. at 607, 196 P. at 1035.
24. In Leavitt v. City of Morris, 105 Minn. 170, 117 N.V. 393 (1908), the court said:
There is... a clear distinction between a person who gets drunk and an insane per-
son, and it may be conceded that one who is simply a drunkard, but is able properly to
take care of himself, his family, and his property, and is not a menace to the public,
cannot be committed to and detained in a hospital for inebriates without his consent,
for the personal rights and liberties of such a person are guaranteed by the constitu-
tion .... Id. at 175, 117 N.W. at 395.
This formulation might not save many drunkards, depending on how the court understood
the word "properly." On the other hand, while saying that commitment was designed for
the protection of the individual as well as of others, the Schwarting court concluded that
this power should be exercised with great caution and only upon such a state of facts
being shown as would justify the forcible intervention of the state for the protection
of persons and property.
76 Neb. 773, 775, 108 N.W. 125 (1906). Unless this formulation wholly begs the question, it
would appear to limit commitment to cases of immediate danger to persons or property
(including the person and property of the individual himself). Both these cases in fact
upheld the commitments in question. In State ex rel. Larkin v. Ryan, however, the court
struck down a commitment which was
not made dependent upon his [petitioner's) inability to attend to business, nor upon
any want of self-control, nor upon his being dangerous to himself or others, but solely
upon his "being an inebriate habitual or common drunkard."
70 Wis. 676, 685, 36 N.V. 823, 827 (1888).
1165
The Yale Law Journal
civil commitment of the insane was constitutional under the broad
general criteria cited by the alcoholics cases, and let the matter go at
that.25 Since then, the official commitment decision has been left
largely to the ad hoc discretion of asylum officials and the courts.
Thus, as to the constitutional issue, we write largely on a clean slate.
At the very least, we would have to define the standards governing the
application of criteria such as danger to self, danger to others, and inca-
pacity to manage one's affairs. But in addition, there is a real question
whether these criteria are the right ones to apply to assess the constitu-
tionality of commitment of addicts. The analogy between "inebriacy"
and insanity may be inapt. In the insanity cases, it is essentially peti-
tioner's insanity which confers on the state parens patriae jurisdic-
tion over him.26 The criteria such as danger to self or others and need
for treatment are conditions set for the purpose of determining who
among the insane may be committed to an institution.2 7 It is not at all
clear that they are appropriate to a determination of who, though not
insane, may be treated as if insane for purposes of commitment.
Moreover, in applying these criteria to justify particular commit-
ments, the courts tend to treat as one the two distinct rationales for
commitment represented by the alternatives in the dangerous-to-self-
or-others formulation. Thus, in In re Hinkle, the court explained that
[p]roceedings for the commitment of the insane, under whatever
form the insanity may arise, are paternal in character. . . . In a
25. The right and duty of the State to provide for the care and treatment of its insane
with such confinement and restraint of their liberty as may be necessary for that pur-
pose is conceded. . . . It is also conceded that the State may, pursuant to general laws,
and after proper judicial proceedings, confine insane persons for their own protection
and that of other persons. . . .The writers and courts have not undertaken to define
the limitations of the power which the State has to deal with these unfortunate people,
except by the announcement of general principles essential to their welfare and the
protection of the public.
In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 418, 48 S.E. 789, 791 (1904).
26. The leading case is In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Reporter 122 (Mass. 1845). See also,
e.g., Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169 (1898); Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich, 90
(1879).
27. In Oakes, Chief Justice Shaw wrote
[I]t is a principle of law that an insane person has no will of his own. In that case It
becomes the duty of others to provide for his safety and their own....
The question must then arise in each particular case, whether a person's own safety
or that of others requires that he should be restrained for a certain time, and whether
restraint is necessary for his restoration or will be conducive thereto.
8 Law Reporter 122, 125 (Mass. 1845) (emphasis added). The few constitutional cases and
many statutes generally retain in some form this additional condition on the right to con-
fine the insane, though some statutes under which modem courts make commitment deci-
sions have dropped it. See F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, supra note 17, at 17-18. Van Deusen
v. Newcomer suggests that insanity may itself establish the needed danger to self or others.
40 Mich. 90, 142 (1879) (opinion of Campbell, C.J.). Accord, Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999,
1001 (W.D. Pa. 1915): the right to restrain the insane is "a necessity growing out of the
inability of the mentally afflicted to care for themselves or prevent injury to others."
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manner they are analogous to guardianship proceedings, but there
is nevertheless a difference which readily distinguishes them from
matters of guardianship... [i.e.] [t]he real basis or foundation for
the proceedings . . . is the protection and safety of the general
public against the acts of irresponsible persons, and ... is predi-
cated upon the general police power of the state.28
This confusion affects more than labels. Plainly the scope of the
state's power of civil commitment depends on whether its ground for
commitment is compassion or public safety. Outside the best of all pos-
sible worlds, the two grounds do not invariably coincide. With rare
exceptions, however, the courts will treat civil commitments as both
legitimately paternalistic and legitimately designed to protect the pub-
lic. They emphasize its benevolent features to justify the absence of
criminal procedural safeguards, and they cite the dangerousness of the
petitioner as a justification for acting benevolently. - In the cases in-
volving the totally insane this approach is not unreasonable. Confine-
ment almost invariably does benefit such persons, who plainly need at
least supervision, and their own opposition to commitment can fairly
28. 33 Idaho 605, 611-12, 196 P. 1035, 1037 (1921) (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W. 2d 897 (1950). See also
People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 468, 311 P.2d 897, 902 (1957):
The main purpose of the act is to protect society against the activities of sexual ps)cho-
paths. The secondary purpose is to rehabilitate the sexual psychopath....
The emphasis that appellant places on the fact that he was originally convicted of a
misdemeanor, and now finds himself in San Quentin, possibly for life, is misplaced.
This argument would be sound only were his confinement punishment. As we have
already seen, the purpose of the confinement is to protect society and to try and cure
the accused.
This fusion of the two rationales is a more or less inevitable product of the natural
human tendency to put the best face on an unhappy situation. In colonial times, local gov-
ernments locked up the violently insane with little ceremony and less compunction under
the police power. But in the 19th century, when the notion took hold that insanity is a
curable disease, not the curse of a demon, the courts fastened on this new benevolent ra-
tionale for commitment and made it do double duty for the protection of the community
as well. The Oakes case, 8 Law Reporter 122 (Mass. 1845), marks the absorption of the
police power justification into the paternal power of parens patriae, which is now typically
defined as
the sovereign power of guardianship of persons under disability and the inherent and
fundamental right and duty of the state to care for persons who are unable to care for
themselves or who are a menace to themselves or to the health, morals or safety of
others.
In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 222-23, 233 P.2d 159, 164 (1951) (opinion of Wilson, J.)
(emphasis added). Shaw called the law of civil commitment "[t]he great law of necessity
and humanity." In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Reporter 1292, 124 (Mass. 1845). A later
court concluded that
[t]he work of the State in caring for the demented within her borders is at once pro-
tective in its character and highly humanitarian.
Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
Necessity and humanity may often be one and the same, but the assumption built into
the language of the law that they are one and the same is likely to produce unfortunate
results.
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be disregarded because "an insane person has no will of his own." a0
Their commitment may accordingly be justified by the interests of
others as well as by their own. But for persons who do have "wills of
their own" the legitimacy of commitment must be established either
under the benevolent power of parens patriae or else under the police
power to protect the community, each power standing alone.
These two grounds for state action must therefore be kept clearly
distinct in analyzing the commitment statutes. If the state petitions
for commitment on the ground that an addict is a menace to others, it
is irrelevant that he might personally benefit from treatment, just as it
is irrelevant to the requirements for imprisonment of a suspected
criminal that he may receive treatment in jail. On the other hand, if the
justification for commitment is paternalistic, the only question is
whether the addict is the sort of person whose own best interests may
legitimately be determined by others. The state cannot fuse an inade-
quate police power justification and an inappropriate exercise of pater-
nalism into a jointly sufficient basis for commitment. In the discussion
that follows, we shall examine each rationale for commitment in turn.
Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts Under the Power of parens
patriae
The constitutional question under the power of parens patriae is
not whether commitment is in the interest of the individual, but
whether the state has the right to decide that question for him. It
raises the larger question of when the state can coerce an individual
for his own good. Yet on this crucial issue, constitutional case law is
strangely mute.
It is clear that American traditions reflect a distinct bias against
benevolent coercion. The conventional morality, the national political
philosophy, and the theory of representative democracy itself are all
50. In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Reporter 122 (Mass. 1845).
The state has the right to commit insane persons for their own good without their con-
sent because they are incapable of giving a meaningful consent. Shaw likens them to per-
sons undergoing surgical operations (without anaesthesia) "where a person cannot have any
will of his own and it becomes necessary that he should be held by others." Id.
Cf. Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 141 (1879): "The law has but one test of in-
sanity, and that is whether a person is compos mentis, or capable of exercising rational
self-control.,'
See also C. TEDAUAN, LxMIATIONS OF POLICE POWER 106 (1886):
[F]or the same reason that the proper authority may forcibly restrain one who is in
the delirium of a fever and subject him to medical treatment, the State has undoubt-
edly the right to provide for the involuntary confinement of the harmlessly insane ....
He is not a rational being, and cannot judge for himself what his needs are.
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predicated on an assumption of individual self-government. Moreover.
the founders thought they were writing a social contract, and the basic
principle of the social contract is that restrictions on liberty are justifi-
able only when necessary for the general welfare. And the entire con-
stitutional scheme reflects the Madisonian principle that the power of
government must be checked and balanced because men cannot by
their nature be trusted to pursue the interests of others.3 '
On the other hand, much welfare legislation of the 20th century has
in it identifiable elements of paternalism, and self-determination is
probably less a fundamental value than it once was. But no court has
ever upheld any of these laws on the ground that it is reasonably
designed to benefit the individuals it coerces. The courts have settled
instead on the substantial police power grounds which also underlie the
legislation.
32
Thus, there is some question as to the legitimacy of any paternalism
toward ordinary citizens which could not be sustained under the police
power. But there is a much clearer bias against benevolent coercion
which is exercised over selected individuals, and not over citizens
generally. In that circumstance, no majority has consented to be coerced
31. See J. BuRus, TmE DEADLOCK OF Da socRAcY: Foua-PRTY PoLrTacs L: AsErn .c 8-23
(1963).
32. The assumptions underlying welfare legislation are: 1) that it is beneficial to the
whole-i.e., even to those who are not direct beneficiaries; and, more importantly, 2) that
the majority of the persons who are to be protected against adversity in fact desire such
protection. As to the minority who do not wish to have their liberty restricted for their
own benefit, the legislation is not paternalistic; rather, their liberty is sacrificed to the gen-
eral welfare of those who do.
The fluoridation cases are commonly cited as instances of judicial recognition of benev-
olent coercion over ordinary citizens. In several cases, fluoridation of drinking water was
challenged as, inter alia, a violation of due process as compulsory treatment of individuals
for their own good. Uniformly, the courts upheld the measures not as paternalistic treat-
ment but as police power measures designed for the protection of the public health--espe-
cially the health of children. In Kraus v. City of Cleveland, petitioner contended "that
every individual has as a part of his personal liberty the right to protect his health as he
deems best to insure a long and happy life .... " The court conceded the premise but
denied his conclusion therefrom:
There can be no disagreement with this basic principle, it having been long recognized
as sound, and the authorities support the proposition....
The right in an individual, however, is not an absolute right but is subject to the
police power of the state ....
The health measure with which we are concerned is designed to prevent caries in
children and to give resistance to tooth decay .. ..Clearl), any reasonable measure
designed to decrease or retard the incidence of dental caries is in the interest and wel-
fare of the public.
66 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 436-38, 116 N.E.2d 779, 794-95 (1953). See also Baer v. Bend, 206 Ore.
221, 292 P.2d 134 (1955); Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (1954); de Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal.
App.2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953).
Of course, the more serious the deprivation of liberty involved, the less reasonable such
general welfare measures become.
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for its own good, and the unwilling victims of official altruism are
impotent to obtain redress through the political process.
Outside commitment law, the state exercises benevolent supervision
over ordinarily competent individuals only in matters concerning the
disposition of property. Under existing law, a person may be subjected
to legal guardianship on a finding that he is incapable of managing his
affairs, or that he is a "spendthrift."33 Similarly, state welfare laws often
authorize case workers to superintend the way in which recipients spend
their dole. But here too the primary purpose may not be benevolent.
As one spendthrift statute reveals, a central concern is that the wastrel
will "expose . . . [his] family to want or suffering or [his] town to
expense.
34
If wholly paternalistic coercion of ordinary citizens is legitimate at
all, plainly it is subject to some limits more stringent than a good-faith
legislative concern for the welfare of the individual coerced. In the
absence of guidance from the courts, the best rule is probably to assume
that the ordinarily competent citizen has a right to self-government
limited only by the just claims of others. This right does not extend to
incompetents, of course: the clear cases are children, lunatics, and
imbeciles. The constitutional issue then becomes the question of
who is incompetent when, for the right to self-government. Under this
formulation, changing public attitudes toward paternalism will be
reflected in an expansion (or contraction) of the scope of incompetence.
33. "Spendthrifts," who are subject to guardianship in almost one-fourth the states, F.
LiNDMAN & D. MCINTYE , supra note 17, at 220, are typically defined as
persons who, by excessive drinking, gambling, idleness or debauchery of any kind have
become incapable of managing their own affairs, or who [so] spend or waste their estate
as to expose themselves or families to want or suffering or their towns to expense ....
18 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3601(2) (1964).
34. Id. For light relief, cf. Matter of Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d
617 (1941) on coercion of welfare recipients. Petitioner had been denied his old age pension
because he refused to stop living under a barn. His argument that he had a right to live as
he chose, that his accommodations were good enough for the pioneers, and that after 65
years of living a good life he was entitled to old age assistance as a reward, fell on deaf
judicial ears-but not because living under a barn was not good for him personally. The
court declined to find from the record that petitioner had led a good life and, that question
aside, concluded that "he should not demand that the public, at its expense, allow him to
experiment with a manner of living which is likely to endanger his health so that he will
become a still greater expense to the public." It also found that he had "no right to defy
the standards and conventions of civilized society . .. at public expense." Id, at 375, 25
N.Y.S.2d at 619-20.
The point is not that the police power grounds are necessarily sufficient to justify such
deprivations of liberty, but only that the existence of such laws does not necessarily Imply
a widespread recognition of the legitimacy of benevolent coercion of such persons. Welfare
law, the law of guardianship, and the law of suicide (see note 36 infra and p. 1171)
all suffer from the failure to distinguish between the paternalistic and the police
power rationales. If some of these laws were analyzed in terms of these rationales separately,
it is possible that neither rationale would be found to be sufficient.
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And the scope may well vary depending on the kind and degree of
liberty which the individual is required to sacrifice.
Where the constitutionality of involuntary civil commitment is at
issue, then, the question is whether the individual is competent to
decide for himself that he needs institutional treatment. Civil commit-
ment for mental therapy is by all odds the gravest of all legally sanc-
tioned deprivations of liberty, imposing as it does both prolonged
confinement and a pervasive invasion of privacy. 5 Here, if anywhere,
the scope of incompetence to decide for oneself must be gauged
narrowly.
Existing law does not regard any adult as incompetent for these
purposes unless he is suffering from a mental disease or defect or
identifiable abnormality. Danger to self has never by itself been made
grounds for commitment or compulsory treatment. Under the statutes,
not even the danger of suicide, short of an actual attempt, justifies
confinement absent a specific finding of mental disability. Of course,
suicide and attempted suicide have long been made criminal. But these
laws were not designed so much for the protection of the would-be
suicide as for the vindication of divine and public morals and the pres-
ervation of the public peace" Similarly, no law provides for compulsory
treatment of cancer or heart disease, or any other non-contagious
physiological ailment. The state's right to quarantine the potentially
contagious,37 to confine tuberculars,38 to vaccinate against small pox 30
and to treat for venereal disease 0 has without exception been rec-
35. For a discussion of mental hospitals as "total institutions," exacting a more compre-
hensive deprivation of liberty than mere prisons, see T. SzAsz, LAw, Lmsn arND PsycHIA-
TRY 53 (1963). The success of the therapy provided necessarily entails a kind of indoctrina-
tion-an invasion and dominance of the patient's psyche.
36. See O'Sullivan, The Ethics of Suicide, 2 CATHoLuc LAw 147 (195. The common
law rule was formulated in Hales v. Petit, 1 Plow. 253, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (C.B. 1563). The
learned court found that suicide was in fact murder with malice prepense. As such it was
"an offense against nature, against God, and against the King." As an offense against nature,
it was "a thing most horrible," which still passes in some courts as a ground for state action
under the police power. As an offense against God, it was a serious violation of the Com-
mandment. Most interestingly, it was an offense against the King "in that hereby he lost
a subject, and ... he being the head has lost one of his m)stical members." The King
represents the community. The court makes this clear by adding finally,
Also, [the suicide] has offended the King, in giving such an example to his subjects,
and it belongs to the King, who has the government of the people, to take care that no
evil example be given them, and an evil example is an offense against him.
Id. at 261, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400.
37. Compagnie Frangaise de Navigation it Vapeur v. La. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380
(1902).
38. Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952).
39. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
40. People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ili. 360, 54 N.E2d 441 (1944).
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ognized in the courts as a right to protect the community, not the
individual.
All this does not prove that it would be unconstitutional to make
danger to self or need for treatment sufficient in themselves to establish
incompetence. The courts have never directly confronted that ques-
tion.-" But the original cases establishing the constitutionality of benev-
olent commitments of the insane assume that only the lack of an
operative rational will in the person to be committed entitles the state
to overrule his preference for freedom.
42
That assumption is fundamentally sound. Incompetence to decide
not to be hospitalized for treatment must be clearly distinguishable
41. In In re Estate of Brooks, 22 111. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), the Illinois Supreme
Court decided that a probate court had erred in appointing a guardian for appellant to
consent on her behalf to a blood transfusion necessary to save her life. Appellant was a
Jehovah's Witness who objected to the transfusion for religious reasons, and the case was
disposed of on First Amendment grounds. The court's discussion, however, may have a
broader application.
Appellees argued that society had "an overriding interest in protecting the lives of its
citizens" which justified benevolent coercion in such a case. They cited cases upholding
compulsory vaccination, prohibition of polygamy and snake-handling, and the appointment
of guardians to consent to a blood transfusion for a minor child and for the mother of a
minor child. Id. at 367-68, 205 N.E.2d at 439-40, and cases cited. The court distinguished
all these cases as involving potential harm to the public welfare (except the case of the
minor child, whom the state may plainly regard as incompetent). Id. at 368, 205
N.E.2d at 437-40. In the absence of such a police power interest, it found that the state had
no right to save appellant's life against her will.
[FMor the courts to attempt to distinguish between religious beliefs or practices on the
ground that they are reasonable or unreasonable would be for them to embark upon a
hopeless undertaking and one which would inevitably result in the end of religious
liberty.
Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442,
Whether the court would have attempted to determine the reasonableness of appellant's
refusal had it not been grounded on religious belief is not altogether dear. But it does seem
that the court's reasoning is equally applicable to benevolent compulsory civil commit-
ments. Liberty itself may well be a preferred freedom. It is not apparent how courts can
determine that a refusal to accept commitment for treatment based, e.g., on an abhorrence
of mental hospitals or on a preference for freedom in misery to confinement in comfort is
unreasonable, without threatening liberty as much as a similar determination as to a reli-
gious belief threatens freedom of religion. Siguificantly, the court concludes, id. at 374, 205
N.E.2d at 442-43, by quoting the broader statement of Judge Burger, dissenting in Appli-
cation of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir.
1964):
Mr. Justice Brandeis, whose views have inspired much of the "right to be let alone"
philosophy, said in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 . . . (1928) (dissenting
opinion):
The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man.
Nothing in the utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual possessed
these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or nell.
founded sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable
and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment even
at great risk.
42. See note 30 supra.
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from commonplace irrationality, ignorance, or weakness of will. Only
diagnosable mental disability can provide that clear distinction.43
But the mere presence of something which a psychiatrist is willing
to call a mental aberration is not enough. In extending the parens
patriae power from the old and clear categories of lunatics and idiots
to the new and fuzzy categories of sexual psycopaths, defective delin-
quents, and "inebriate persons," the courts have adhered to the formal
requirement established by the old insanity cases at the expense of its
rationale. The essential requirement for a finding of incompetence is
the presence of a mental disability which has substantial effects on the
individual's capacity to make decisions for himself-i.e., on his powers
of reasoning, understanding, perception, or self-control.44 Moreover,
where the issue is his competence to make a particular decision, his
disability must be directly relevant to his capacity to make that decision.
Thus, a man's incapacity to decide not to molest little boys may justify
commitment on police power grounds; but it does not establish his
43. If the requirement of diagnosable mental disability were eliminated, it teems clear
that an individual could, consistently with fundamental concepts of liberty, be denied the
right to go untreated only on a showing that no reasonable man could prefer the sickness
to the attempted cure, taking into consideration the effects of the disease, the probability
of successful treatment, and the consequences attendant upon such treatment. Given the
inevitable uncertainty of success in any medical treatment and the grave deprivation of
liberty which involuntary hospitalization always involves, it is doubtful whether such a
standard could in practice be met.
44. Compare the provision in the Draft Act on hospitalization of the mentally ill, which
requires that a non-dangerous person committed on grounds of mental illness must lack
"sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his hospitaliza-
tion .... NATIONAL INSTITrrUTE FOR MENTAL HEALTH, A DRAFr Acr GO vErvixG HosriTAu-
ZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 9(g)(3), at 9 (Public Health Service, pub. no. 51, 1952). The
Commentary on this section notes:
It should be emphasized that it is not a question of the individual agreeing or dis-
agreeing with medical judgment as to the nature of his illness or the need for hospital
care, but rather whether he is capable of making a responsible, not necessarily a wise,
decision....
Id. at 29.
This requirement has been criticized on the ground that:
the precise meaning of the term "responsible" is elusive. There is no clear statement of
the factors which should be weighed in valuating the individual's "capacity" to make
a "responsible decision." The subtle difference pointed out in the Commentary between
the capacity to make a "responsible" decision and the capacity to make a "wve" deci-
sion proves illusory when one attempts to set up manageable criteria for involuntary
hospitalization. It would seem, to cite only one objection, that an unwise decision in
itself contributes some evidence of a lack of capacity to make a responsible decision.
F. Im sAN & D. MCINTYRE, supra note 17, at 20.
The distinction between an incapacity to make a responsible or wise decision and the
making of an irresponsible or unvise decision is clear enough, however. The difficulty is to
identify such an incapacity. An apparently irrational opposition to treatment may be some
evidence of incapacity, but, under the standard suggested here, it cannot be sufficient. It
must also be established by competent medical testimony that the individual has a mental
disability and that this disability has affected his decision-making capacity to an extent
which markedly distinguishes him from the ordinary citizen of minimum standard intelli-
gence.
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incompetence to decide any other question, including the question of
whether or not to undergo treatment for his problem.45
Paternalism and Narcotic Addicts
Narcotic addiction passes as a mental disability only because it typi-
cally involves psychological as well as physical dependence on drugs.
The question is whether that psychological dependence on narcotics
disqualifies an addict to decide for himself whether he wants to be
cured.
The precedents imply that it does. In the few cases challenging
inebriate commitment statutes, the courts reason that chronic alcoholics
have by definition lost their powers of self-control; ergo, alcohol addicts
may be committed on the same principles as insane persons.
40
But if addicts have lost their powers of self-control, so have all chain
smokers and compulsive gamblers. They have all lost control over a
partial and clearly limited area of conduct, but not over conduct or
decision-making capacity generally. They are unable to decide not to
smoke or gamble, but they are as competent to decide to attempt a cure
of their habit as to decide whether to undergo an operation or to come
in out of the rain. Addiction, as a shorthand expression for compulsive
psychological dependence, makes no man a ward of the state unless
his weakness has some additional effects on his mental processes
generally.
There is no evidence that addiction to narcotic drugs has such addi-
tional effects as would invariably warrant a finding of incompetence.
Like some alcoholics, an addict may retain the capacity to run his own
life in a tolerable and intelligent fashion apart from his habit.47 Many
persons can be addicted for decades without intellectual or moral
deterioration. Doctors who are addicts maintain prosperous and com-
petent practices and often lead such ostensibly normal lives that friends
and neighbors do not even suspect their addiction.48 Indeed, a few
45. Once incompetence has been established, however, it does not appear that the
criterion of danger to self has constitutional significance. Since the individual is incom-
petent to decide for himself, the state has acquired the right to decide his own best interest
for him. Even if he is not dangerous to -himself, treatment may well be in his interest. On
the other hand, even if he needs treatment, commitment might not be in his interest if the
prospects for cure are poor, if the facilities are inadequate or demeaning, or if his abhor-
rence of hospitals is intense.
46. See the cases cited in note 22 supra and pp. 1164-65.
47. "The facts tend to indicate that the use of drugs like heroin and morphine is con.
sistent both with a reasonable state of health and with a reasonable degree of efficiency on
the part of the user." Ploscowe, supra note 13, at 46.
48. See R. DE RoPP, DRUGS AND THE MIND 147-48 (1957); Kolb, Pleasure and Deteriora-
tion from Narcotic Addiction, 9 MENTAL HYGIENE 699 (1925).
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persons can function more normally as addicts than they ever could
without drugs, which help them to cope with otherwise intolerable
tensions.
49
It is commonly said that under the influence of narcotics the most
pressing of problems lose their urgency and recede into a distant
limbo.50 Logically an addict would thus be practically incompetent
to decide about his need for treatment because drugs prevent him from
confronting his own problems. But many addicts do in fact volunteer
for both treatment and institutional confinement, and the evidence is
that many more would do so if more, better publicized, and less ap-
parently hostile facilities were made available.5 1 There are even a few
reported cases of self-cure.5
2
49. Ploscowe, supra note 13, at 47-49. Drugs may, at the very least, save the addict from
a worse fate.
What would our hypothetical maladjusted individual do if he did not turn to drug
use? He would find some other means of coping with his problem which might be
either more or less alarming than his addiction. He might turn to barbiturates or al-
cohol as a substitute for drugs. He might seek gratification by "acting out" his mal-
adjustment through expressions of hostility, sexual aggressiveness, exhibitionism.
W. ELDU mGE, NARcoTics AN = LAw 24 (1962). "As a matter of fact some who at one time
were gutter alcoholics have improved themselves and their social functioning by shifting to
morphine." Ploscowe, supra note 13, at 48.
50. It is difficult to assess the validity of this generalization. It does seem to be an accu-
rate description of the typical addict in the street, but the reason may be less the effect of
the drug than the constant preoccupation with obtaining it which is the lot of the im-
poverished addict. See Ploscowe, supra note 13, at 46-47. But the net effect of reducing the
urgency of problems depends on how urgent the problems were before they were reduced.
It may be that for some persons it is the reduction in urgency which enables them to con-
front their problems dispassionately. See note 49 supra.
51. "[r]ndividuals addicted to narcotics will voluntarily look for help if it is offered to
them by people who understand them and who offer aid which realistically meets their
particular needs."
The narcotics program of the East Harlem Protestant Parish alone, with a full-time
staff of 3, with a small office in an old store, with a program geared to help only those
from the immediate neighborhood, has records of having seen 2,175 separate addicted
individuals looking for help. This means that just under 5 percent of all the reported
narcotics users in the United States and 10 percent of those in New York have of their
own free will come to one agency asking for assistance.
Eddy, The Quest for Help by Addicted Individuals in the United States, in Pnoca mNcs,
Wra HousE CONFERENcE ON NAacoTrcs AND DRUG AnusE 175 (1952). Indeed, Dr. Ramirez
believes that most addicts will voluntarily undertake long-term rehabilitation if they are
approached by people they can trust and given confidence in the possibility of success.
Ramirez, supra note 14.
A nagging difficulty with a requirement of voluntariness as a condition of treatment for
any kind of mental disorder is the possibility that the disorder may prevent an afflicted
person from admitting to himself that he has a disorder. See Analysis of Legal and Medical
Considerations in Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 56 YA.E L.J. 1178, 1184 (1947). In gen-
eral, mental illness which may have this effect can on that ground establish incompetence.
It has been argued that most addicts are poorly motivated for treatment for this very
reason-i.e., that as psychopaths they typically refuse to believe that they are sick. AM.M-
CAN fEDICcAL ASSOCIATION, COUNGIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, NAIcorc ADDICTION 36 (19-).
The force of the argument is not altogether dear. Plainly, addicts know well enough that
they suffer from addiction-i.e., a compulsive need for drugs not shared by the population
at large. Plainly, too, they know its principal effects. The argument may well be only that
for the many addicts who have underlying psychiatric problems, addiction prevents them
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Nor is the failure to volunteer for treatment good evidence of an
incapacity to make rational decisions. The apparent irrationality of a
particular decision is not ordinarily grounds for permitting the state
to overrule it, but even if it were, an addict's refusal to be treated is not
necessarily irrational. For one thing, even if the cure were always a
lesser evil than the disease, the prospect of cure is uncertain and distant,
and the prospects of long confinement and indefinite supervision are
correspondingly excellent. Moreover, whatever his failings, the addict
has a special competence with regard to assessing the value of treatment
for him. He may not know what commitment would be like, but he
better than anyone knows the evils of addiction, and he knows what his
life was like before addiction. The point is not that addiction is bliss,
but rather that for many addicts neither is life without drugs5a Even an
informed, intelligent, and otherwise sane addict might conceivably
prefer not to endure institutional confinement for the privilege of
facing the world without a crutch.
Addiction itself, then, is not grounds for benevolent commitment.
Nor, a fortiori, is an imminent danger of addiction resulting from the
repeated use of narcotics.04 Repeated use without addiction is not itself
from recognizing these problems and the need of treatment for them. ("They feel that, in
the drug, they have the answer to their symptoms." Id.) Such addicts may well be commit-
table on account of their underlying mental illness.
It is also possible, however, that the argument refers to the "psychopathy" of the addict
as the disease he does not recognize. The American Psychiatric Association classifies drug
addiction as a kind of "sociopathic personality disturbance." It says by way of definition-
Individuals to be placed in this category are ill primarily in terms of society and of
conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu, and not only in terms of personal dis-
comfort and relations with other individuals.
AMEmcAN PsYcHIATRic AssOcIATION, MENTAL DISORDEas 38 (1952). The real question here
is whether persons who are "ill primarily in terms of society and of conformity with the
prevailing social norms" can legitimately be said to "need treatment" for their own benefit
at all. Compulsory treatment undertaken for such an "illness" seems designed for the bette-
fit of society, not the individual. To argue that a psychopath or sociopath must be com-
mitted because he does not recognize his need for treatment of his sociopathic disorder begs
the question of whether, from the standpoint of his interests, he "needs treatment" at all.
52. See Eddy, supra note 51, at 176. For a graphic description of one such self-cure, see
DE Ror', supra note 48, at 150-54.
53. See notes 12-16 supra and pp. 1162-64. The prospect for permanent cure of
addiction is uncertain enough in itself. But even if the new programs do succeed in deter-
ring addicts from the use of drugs by means of treatment, persuasion, and the threat of
more-or-less perpetual subjection to official custody or supervision, this "cure" may be for
some addicts a prescription for permanent unaddicted misery. The after-care and occupa-
tional training aspects of the new programs are admirable in conception. But the problems
inherent in the rehabilitation of non-addicted members of alienated minority group sub.
cultures belie the naivet6 of great optimism about the prospects for rehabilitation of
such persons who have in addition been narcotic addicts.
54. Both the new programs authorize commitment of any person found to be in Im-
minent danger of addiction by reason of repeated use of drugs. See note 5 supra. As dis-
tinguished from addiction itself, this must mean that the physical and psychological com-
pulsiveness of drug use which is the identifying characteristic of addiction as commonly
understood is not yet present. Unless he has some other mental disability, a person in Im.
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a mental disability of any sort, nor is there here even that limited loss
of self-control which some courts have in other contexts mistakenly
thought to be sufficient for commitment.
But that is not to say that the state has no power to commit any nar-
cotic addicts or narcotic users for their own good. Many addicts suffer
from serious mental disturbances which, either by themselves or as ag-
gravated by prolonged addiction, may be grounds for commitment.
Addiction is most often a sign of an underlying emotional disturbance.
The disturbance may be no more than the neurosis of the aggressive
businessman, but it may also be symptomatic of the kind of mental
illness which can deprive an individual of the capacity to make deci-
sions for himself which are entitled to respect.: Prolonged addiction
itself may sometimes lead to a general deterioration of behavioral con-
trols or to a kind of racking insanity, comparable to the alcoholic's
delirium tremens. In all these cases the addict is committable: not,
however, qua addict, but qua incompetent.
Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts Under the Police Power
Where the benevolent rationale is insufficient, the case for civil
commitment must be argued in the unfamiliar language of preventive
detention. Narcotic addicts are reportedly responsible for half the
crimes commited in New York City, and the prospect of catching all
those potential criminals in a single Supreme Court-proof net has
constituted the principal legislative appeal of the new commitment
programs. 56 Commitment has also been touted as an effective means
minent danger of addiction stands in pari inaterii with a cardiac patient in imminent
danger of a heart attack by reason of repeated over-exertion. Over-exertion may perhaps be
deemed more "rational" conduct than repeated use of drugs (but query?). The problem is
that there is nothing on which to sustain a finding of incompetence which would permit
the state to make that judgment for an individual and enforce it on him.
55. Drug addiction is usually symptomatic of a personality disorder ... ; the proper
personality classification to be made is an additional diagnosis. Drug addiction [may
be] symptomatic of organic brain disorders, psychotic disorders, psychophysiological
disorders, and psychoneurotic disorders....
A.AmucA PsYcIATRIc AssocIoN, supra note 51, at 39. These underlying disorders ma'
or may may not be sufficient to establish incompetence in an individual case. See also W.
EEDRmIGE, N~Acorscs AND THE LAw 21-24 (1962).
56. See Rockefeller, supra note 19. The Governor touted his program as an anti-crime
measure in his campaign for reelection in 1966. At one news conference, he said
that anybody who liked crime on the streets ought to vote for Frank D. O'Connor.
"Frank O'Connor's election would mean," he said, "that narcotic addicts would be free
to continue to roam the streets: to mug, to purse-snatch, to steal, and even to murder."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1966, at 23, col. 3.
Addicts do have a high crime rate, but not that high. The 50 per cent figure appears to
be a canard, since it apparently includes violations of the narcotic prohibition laws, which
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of stemming the spread of addiction to new victims:57 institutionalizing
addicts removes from the population at once a source of contagion and
the largest body of violators of the laws prohibiting purchase, use,
possession, and sale of narcotics. The question is whether any of these
public interests can justify confinement of all addicts.
Preventive Detention Under Due Process: The Certainty of Harm
Preventive detention is constitutionally disfavored, but precisely
how disfavored is a question the courts have managed to avoid. Indeed,
a measure of its disfavor is the extent to which its presence is camou-
flaged in orthodox legal doctrine. 5 Whenever possible, the courts have
preferred to justify civil commitments as acts of benevolence on the
basis of their provision for treatment.59
nearly all addicts necessarily break every day. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Tsit
ILLICrr NARcoTIcs TuRAic, S. REP. No. 1440, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1956).
57. See Kuh, Civil Commitment and Probation, in PRocEr aINs, WHITE HOUSE CONFER-
ENCE ON NARCOrC AND DRUG ABUSE 184, 185 (1962).
58. The right to bail (except in capital cases), the constitutional protection against "cx
cessive" bail, and the orthodox doctrine that the sole permissible consideration in setting
bail is the need to deter the defendant from absconding, make an obvious case In point.
See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 840 111. 464, 175
N.E. 8 (1930). The practice, of course, is often understandably different where the defen-
dant is a recidivist felon or where there is good reason to fear retaliation against witnesses;
and not all judges are as candid as the judge in the Snow case, who expressly stated in
fixing exorbitant (for ensuring appearance at trial) bail, "If I thought he would get out
on that I would make it more." Id. at 469, 178 N.E. at 9. Without some such candor an
appellate court has a hard time finding most bail amounts unconstitutionally excessive.
Vagrancy laws are also commonly employed to confine persons thought to be dangerous
but guilty of no more precise crime. See Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70
YALE L.J. 1 (1960).
59. See note 29 supra. This tendency is so pervasive that there is doubt in some quarters
whether any purely preventive detention is permissible. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Dan-
gerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Ac-
quitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 287 (1960): "Sickness of the individual and
his need for treatment or care is the only justification for using 'likelihood of dangerous.
ness' as a basis for deprivation of liberty." See also Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288, 1291 (1966):
The Robinson dicta suggesting that civil commitment is constitutional are in para.
graphs expressing a favorable attitude to state action . . . assuring treatment for IlI
citizens. But commitment of dangerous persons is a harder case, because the chief pur-
pose of such a measure is to afford protection for society, not to ensure treatment of
the patient. If a case arose in which medical testimony indicated that a patient could
not be helped by treatment . . . . but he was nonetheless committed as dangerous,
the court might well hold that the state was punishing the patient for an illness and
thus inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.
Such a case did in fact arise, after a fashion. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966), where the court found a statutory right to treatment for persons committed pur-
suant to an acquittal by reason of insanity and called involuntary civil confinement withiout
treatment "shocking," id. at 455.
But this view of commitment of the dangerous is misconceived in two respects. First,
whether, on balance, treatment would confer a "benefit" is, for competent persons, a ques-
tion to be decided by the individual concerned, not the state. If a sane and intelligent old
tubercular would rather live his remaining days in freedom with his family, the state would
be obliged to allow him to do so if it could not commit him on grounds of dangerousness.
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No one seriously doubts that the state may commit persons suffering
from contagious diseases. But beyond those instances of virtually certain
danger to others, there is very little case law in point. In Minnesota ex
tel. Pearson v. Probate Court, the Supreme Court held constitutional
a sexual psychopath law which authorized commitment of persons who
by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have
evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses
and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury,
loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire.60
The Court found that the statute as construed was not unconstitution-
ally vague, but it had nothing to say about the requisite standard of
likelihood.6 1 In Lynch v. Overholser 2 on the other hand, the Court
refused to permit commitment of a defendant who had been exculpated
on a plea of insanity entered for him against his wil. The holding is
limited, but the grounds of the opinion strongly intimate that the
commission of a crime, coupled with the possibility of mental illness,
does not itself prove a man dangerous enough to warrant his confine-
ment on grounds of dangerousness alone.63
The logical conclusion of a theory which justifies commitment only on grounds of benefit
to the individual is that only incompetent dangerous sick people can be committed.
Second, it cannot seriously be contended that the state has no right to restrain the vio-
lently contagious or the violently insane. The right of self-protection is as old as the com.
mon law and as durable as common sense. The state may have a duty in such cases to
provide treatment wherever possible. But its right to confine is not contingent on the pos-
sibility of treatment, even if it may be contingent on the provision of treatment where
treatment is possible.
This fundamental confusion about preventive detention is a direct result of the courts'
tendency to merge the two separate rationales for civil commitment into one multi-purpose
but invariably benevolent state power. See note 29 supra.
60. 309 U.S. at 273.
61. The Court did say that the statute calls for "evidence of past conduct pointing to
probable consequences," and it suggested that if sexual psychopaths were defined merely
as persons "guilty of sexual misconduct" or "having strong sexual propensities," the statute
would be "perhaps unconstitutional in its application." Id. at 273-74. It is w-orth noting
that the requirement of utter lack of power to control sexual impulses coupled with evi-
dence that that lack of power leads to illegal and injurious conduct in the case of the
petitioner, does in fact yield a very high degree of certainty that he will cause harm to
others if not committed.
62. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
63. Mr. Justice Harlan said he was constrained to hold inapplicable a District of Co-
lumbia statute which provided for mandatory civil commitment after a successful insanity
defense, in order to "free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts."
[Tjhe fact that the accused has pleaded guilty or that, overcoming some defense other
than insanity, the Government has established that he committed a criminal act consti-
tutes only strong evidence that his continued liberty would imperil "the preservation
of public peace." It no more rationally justifies his indeterminate commitment to a
mental institution on a bare reasonable doubt as to past sanity than would any other
cogent proof of possible jeopardy to "the rights of persons and of property .... *
As to commitment under the statute following voluntary insanity pleas, the Court specu-
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As a general rule, Anglo-American law permits prolonged confine-
ment for the protection of society only where a man has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to have been legally responsible for the
commission of a criminal act. 64 A culpable criminal act is, of course,
some evidence of dangerousness, and imprisonment does serve inter
alia a preventive detention function. But the principal rationale of the
act requirement is the belief that it is ordinarily unjust to punish a man
or to sacrifice him for community purposes unless he has wrongfully
harmed the community. For the same reason, the Constitution obliges
the state to set a convicted criminal free after he has served a prison
term deemed commensurate with the gravity of his offense-even if he
is still as dangerous as he was on the day he went in.oa
If in extreme cases the state also has some power to confine on the
lated that Congress might have intended thereby to discourage false pleas of insanity. But
it did not consider the constitutional sufficiency of that concern as a ground for confine-
ment.
64. It has been said that it is "the fundamental function of the criminal law to safe-
guard every individual from the imposition of sanctions solely for his potential dangerous-
ness." Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Obseruations on the De-
cision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 237 (1960). Cf.
In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C.), aJ'd, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958):
The staff of St. Elizabeth's Hospital advised that Dallas 0. Williams at the present time
shows no evidence of active mental illness but that he is potentially dangerous to
others and if released is likely to repeat his patterns of criminal behavior, and might
commit homicide. Id. at 872.
But the court ordered his release:
However commendable was the court's purpose to protect the public from the release
to society of a man '"potentially dangerous to others," there is no District of Columbia
statute or inherent equity power permitting commitment to any institution upon that
showing alone. Many persons who are released to society upon completing the service
of sentences in criminal cases are just as surely potential menaces to society as is this
petitioner, having a similar pattern of anti-social behavior, lack of occupational adjust-
ment, and absence of remorse or anxiety; yet the courts have no legal basis of ordering
their continued confinement on mere apprehension of future unlawful acts, and must
wait until another crime against society is committed or they are found insane in
proper mental health proceedings before confinement may be ordered. Id. at 876.
The statutes of only one state authorize commitment of psychopaths, other than sexual
psychopaths-that is, of persons whose mental "illness" consists solely in a failure to In-
ternalize community norms inhibiting antisocial conduct. F. LINDMAN & D. MCINryhE, supra
note 17, at 18; MAss. GaN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (1965) C' 'mentally ill' person . . shall
mean [inter alia] a person subject to a ...character disorder which renders him so de-
ficient in judgment ... that he . . .is likely to conduct himself in a manner which
dearly violates the established laws, or ordinances, conventions or morals of the commu.
nity. ) But see Dodd v. Hughes, 81 Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540 (1965). Arguably, this is the most
generally dangerous class of persons in the population.
65. The generally accepted view is that:
imprisonment for such a length of time as to be out of all proportion to the gravity of
the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable men, is cruel
and unusual within the meaning of the constitution.
State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952), and cases cited therein. See also
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d
273 (1948). The question is ultimately one of fundamental universal standards of decency,
not of rationality. See Packer, Making Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. Rtv. 1071,
1076 (1964).
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sole ground of probable dangerousness to others, that power must be
subject to limits as stringent as those which govern confinement of
actual criminals. Preventive detention, no less than imprisonment, is
a deprivation of liberty in the interest of the community. The condi-
tions of confinement may be strikingly similar. Unless the civil inmate
is incompetent, the fact that he may be provided treatment does not
distinguish the two types of incarceration, since the civil inmate may be
untreatable and since treatment may also be provided to imprisoned
criminals.06 From the point of view of the person confined, the shade of
difference between civil preventive detention and criminal confinement
is in the associated stigma, and it is at most a shade. The state does not
notably enhance a man's community standing by branding him a drug
addict, a sexual psychopath, or a dangerous lunatic, rather than a crim-
inal.67 Even the slightest difference is hard to perceive in the case of
narcotic addicts who are committed in an atmosphere of public clamor
over their supposed inveterate criminality. It is primarily life and
liberty which the Constitution protects at such potentially great cost to
the public safety; and it would in any case be extraordinary if these
were guarded less thoroughly than reputation.
Since the fundamental value at stake is identical, the constitutional
restrictions must likewise be the same for both civil and criminal con-
finements. In particular, the state must sustain as heavy a burden of
proof in order to detain a dangerous person as it must to imprison a
criminal: that is, dangerousness must be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt.68 To permit preventive detention on any lesser showing of
66. It might be different if treatment could be simply and effectively provided with a
minimal deprivation of liberty. See pp. 1185-87 infra. But prolonged confinement is no less
preventive detention because it also attempts to work a preventive cure. Similarly, the fact
that treatment may be beneficial to the inmate is irrelevant unless the state has the right
under the power of parens patriae to force treatment on him for his own good. And if it
has that right, it need not rely on its power of preventive detention in order to justify
ommitment.
67. The cases which support different procedural standards for civil and criminal com-
mitments rarely confront the ground for distinction between preventive detention and
imprisonment. Wherever commitment is predicated in part on the presence of a mental
illness, the courts tend to treat the proceedings as paternal in character and argue in effect
that even if the commitment also serves a preventive detention function, it is essentially a
benevolent, non-adversary proceeding because it is in the interest of the petitioner. See
note 29 supra.
68. But some sexual psychopath statutes provide for commitment on grounds only of
danger to others. Here, the theory is that "civil" commitments are not subject to the con-
stitutiona protections accorded criminal defendants because they are not retributive and
therefore not punishment. It is evidently this distinction which the Court found persuasive
in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in distinguishing between addiction as a
crime and addiction as a ground for civil commitment. See especially the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, 370 US. 668, 676.77:
Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the
addict of a crime .... The purpose of [the statute] is not to cure but to penalize. ...
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dangerousness could be justified only if there were a substantial prac-
tical difference between the criminal and the civil sanction.
It is said that contingent harm can never be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt.6 But in some cases it is surely possible to predict harm as
confidently as a second-hand trier of fact can conclude that a particular
act was performed with a particular intent. 0 If as a result of this re-
quirement preventive detention is in practice available only in excep-
tional cases, that is as it should be. Given the difficulty of predicting
human behavior, preventive detention is and ought to be an extra-
ordinary expedient.
A man suffering from contagious disease will cause harm to some
A prosecution for addiction, with its resulting stigma and irreparable damage to the
good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a means of protecting society where
a civil commitment would do as well.
Where the issue is the meaning of "punishment" in the 8th Amendment, it may be appro-
priate to define it in the traditional terms of retributive (as well as preventive or curative)
intent. Thus anticipatory civil commitment, no matter what its practical effect, could never
be a cruel and unusual punishment. But where the issue is the applicability of funda.
mental due process protection against a deprivation of liberty, surely it is the extent and
consequences of the deprivation, not the character of the form under which the depriva.
tion is brought about, which is paramount. Incarceration by any other name confines as
much. The form is important only insofar as it may affect the consequences of confinement
.to the person confined. As to that question, Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting remarks seem
to have much force:
Any reliance upon the "stigma" of a misdemeanor conviction in this context is mis-
placed, as it would hardly be different from the stigma of a civil commitment for
narcotics addiction.
370 U.S. at 683n.l. In spite of the best efforts of knowledgeable writers the public knows
an addict as a "dope fiend," an inveterate criminal and a moral degenerate. See Eldrldge,
supra note 49, at 13-28. And "it is common knowledge that the man with the brand of
'addict' burned upon his reputation is almost impossible to place" in a job. Eddy, supra
note 51, at 177.
The cases are silent on the specific question of burden of proof that harm to others will
result if the respondent in a preventive detention proceeding is not confined. This silence
reflects the general failure to develop standards for determining how dangerous a man
must be to be subject to civil commitment. See pp. 1164-65, supra. And witness the general
paucity of cases in which commitment is conceded to rest on the power of preventive
detention. The general existing rule on commitment of the mentally ill as derived from
the practice of the courts is that "there must exist that degree of mental unsoundness as
to make it reasonably probable that, if allowed to remain at large, [respondent) would...
endanger life, person, or property .... " 44 CJ.S. Insane Persons § 64 (19-15) (emphasis
added). But this rule has been derived from cases which assume that the mental illness of
the respondent confers on the state parens patriae jurisdiction over him. The question In
those cases has been: given his insanity, how dangerous must a man be to himself or others
before he can be committed? They were not addressed to a situation where the right to
commit depends solely on the respondent's dangerousness, regardless of its origin, and
where his incompetence is irrelevant.
69. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HAsv. L.
REv. 1288, 1291 (1966). The objection seems to be essentially verbal. It is true that "it might
never be possible to show 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that a person is [highly] likely to
behave dangerously," id., because "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "likely" are different
standards. But the standard of likelihood and the standard of proof are not two different
.standards, but the same. What is at issue is whether the respondent will in fact cause harm
unless he is confined. The various standards of proof correspond to varying degrees of
certainty as to future conduct which are to be required of the trier of facts.
-70. Perfect certainty is impossible in both cases.
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other person beyond a reasonable doubt. So will a raving lunatic. Ad-
mittedly, proof of future acts beyond a reasonable doubt will be prac-
tically impossible to achieve in the absence of some form of identifiable
mental abnormality which deprives a man of power to control his
dangerous impulses. But for police power commitments, the requisite
mental "illness" may be broadly defined to include those limited
personality disorders, including drug addiction, which are irrelevant
to the legitimacy of commitment under the power of parens patridae.7
The Dangerousness of Narcotic Addicts
The question, then, is whether addiction per se renders all its victims
public menaces? Can it be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that narcotic
addicts will cause harm to others unless they are confined? Addicts are
widely thought to be compulsive criminals as well as compulsive drug
users, and if we were sure that an addict would mug old ladies, there is
little doubt that he could be confined indefinitely.
But in fact, the drug addict qua addict poses no special threat to the
public lives or limbs.
The effects of opiates are, in general, exactly the opposite of the
effects of alcohol, which tends to reduce normal inhibitions and
to release aggressions. ... The sense of well-being and satisfaction
with the world are so strong that, coupled with the depressant
action of the drug, the individual is unlikely to commit aggressive
or violent crime after he is addicted, even though he professionally
or habitually did so previous to addiction .... In the words of
Kolb, "Both heroin and morphine in large doses change drunken
fighting psychopaths into sober, cowardly, non-aggressive idlers."72
In a rare display of scholarly unanimity, all the experts on addiction
agree that "crimes of violence are rarely, and sexual crimes almost
never, committed by addicts."73
The crimes addicts are very likely to commit are offenses against
property, especially petty theft. An addict's habit may cost him any-
71. Thus if "sociopathic personalities" can be convincingly diagnosed, it is reasonable
to permit such a diagnosis to qualify as a potential ground for police poiwer commitments,
though it is unreasonable to allow it as a ground for commitment for the good of the
individual. In refusing to permit commitment of such persons, note 64 supra, the law has
here fallen prey to its failure to separate in its thinking the separate rationales for
commitment.
72. D. AfAuER & V. VoGEL, NARcorEcS AND NA corc AnnicroN 215-16 (1954).
73, Jon-r CommTrr op Tr HAMmrc B.4 AssocuATioN AND THEArAmm-cw N Mr-cAL
ASsOCiATION (Final Report), supra note 13, at 165. The Joint Committee concluded that "in
terms of the number afflicted and... ill effects on others in the community, drug addiction
is a problem of far less magnitude than alcoholism." Id,
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where from $35 to $70 a week.74 The vast majority of addicts do not
ordinarily make that kind of recreation money. Hence, it would often
be possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a given addict will
steal.75 On the other hand, it is clear that no such showing could be
made for every addict. Some addicts are rich, some hold steady jobs, and
a small but significant minority are doctors who have access to drugs at
moderate prices.
The other substantial harm to which addicts contribute is the spread
of addiction to other persons. Narcotic addiction is, in a sense, con-
tagious. It spreads through contact with addicts, in much the same way
as does cigarette-smoking or any other acquired habit. Contact with
addicts may suggest to the uninitiated the possibility of using narcotics,
provide him with information as to sources of supply and techniques
of use, and introduce him to an environment in which such use is
socially approved. If all addicts were behind bars, fewer persons would
experiment with narcotics and fewer would become addicted.
But without evidence that a particular addict is a pusher or a
proselytizer, it could never be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that
he will cause another to become addicted. In pertinent contrast, such
a showing could be made that a tubercular will at some time infect
some other person.
76
Moreover, even if an addict does by the mere fact of his existence
contribute to another's addiction, his responsibility is indirect and
fractional. It is shared with many other drug-users and with the person
who becomes addicted. The state does have some power to restrict the
liberty of persons who are collectively dangerous where it cannot show
the dangerousness of each individual. But that power, applicable to
74. Chein, Narcotics Use Among Juveniles, I SociAL WoRK 50 (1956), in J. O'DONNELL P,
J. BALL, supra note 12, at 128.
75. Commitment predicated partly on grounds of poverty might well give courts pause,
however. Doubtless it could, on the same kind of evidence, also be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that various destitute persons who for some reason do not receive welfare
payments will steal.
Whether the certain danger of theft is in any case grave enough to warrant commitment
is, of course, an additional question.
76. It is the biological cause-effect relationship between exposure and infection which
makes communicable disease, even if not highly contagious, an unquestioned ground for
preventive detention. All that is required is the virtual certainty that someone, somewhere
will be infected by the diseased person. The presence of contagious infection may provide
that certainty beyond a reasonable doubt; but the "contagion" of addiction depends on
the chance effects of an addict's contacts and the personalities of the persons with whom
he mingles.
Clearly, too, the probability that an addict will be responsible for another's addiction
depends on the conspicuousness of his addiction. Addicts who conceal their addiction from
all but family and close friends, e.g., addicted doctors, are extremely unlikely to cause the
spread of addiction by social contact.
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vaccinations, curfews, and emergency quarantines, cannot extend to
prolonged total deprivations of liberty.
7 7
Finally, it is undeniably true that nearly all addicts will purchase or
possess narcotics illegally as a matter of course. Probably the prevention
of such violations would never be seriously advanced as a sufficient
ground for civil commitment of addicts. But if it were, it is open to an
objection which applies equally to the argument from the certainty of
theft. In both cases, the virtual certainty that addicts will break the
law is in a direct sense the state's own fault. An addict's need for
narcotics is by definition beyond his control. By denying him legal
access to narcotics, the state makes him ipso facto an habitual criminal.
By obliging him to obtain his drugs at exorbitant black market prices,
the same legislative policy also drives poor addicts inexorably to theft.
It flouts fundamental fairness for the state to force a man to commit
crimes and at the same time to punish or confine him on grounds of his
resultant criminality.
Perhaps due process could tolerate such unfairness to individuals if
the legislative policy served a compelling public need which could be
met in no other way. But there are effective alternatives to prohibiting
narcotics to narcotic addicts. A properly supervised program under
which doctors were allowed to prescribe limited quantities of narcotics
to addicts would not significantly impair--and might well enhance-the
effectiveness of the state's control of drug use and the narcotic traffic
generally. Apart from its alleged "immorality." " the principal objection
77. The quarantine principle does permit some group deprivations of liberty without
regard to the injustice done to individuals. But the distinguishing features of quarantines,
curfews, and the like are: 1) that they are temporary, 2) that they are in the nature of
emergency measures, and 3) that they are less than total deprivations of liberty. In contrast,
civil commitment of narcotic addicts is a permanent institutional approach to an enduring
social problem, and involves prolonged incarceration.
Ultimately, of course, the issue is one of just proportion between means and ends. The
drug problem is serious, but the proposed means are extreme. Cf. Korematsu Y. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where the Court upheld the exclusion of citizens of Japanese
ancestry from their homes only as an exercise of the war power in a time of total war. The
Court was at pains to make clear that:
[n]othing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest
imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify either [exclusion
from homes or permanent night-time curfews] .. . .Compulsory exclusion of large
groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direct emergency
and peril is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.
Id. at 218-20. Two Justices thought the exclusion even in time of war to be flagrantly
unconstitutional. Id. at 225 (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J.), id. at 233 (dissenting
opinion of Murphy, J.).
78. A Senate subcommittee rejected this approach with righteous indignation:
Finally, we believe the thought of permanently maintaining drug addiction with
"sustaining" doses of narcotic drugs to be utterly repugnant to the moral principles
inherent in our law and the character of our people.
SENATE Coi MrrrE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOsrrTrEE ON ItpRovsErm,%rs n Titi FEDEntAL
1185
The Yale Law Journal
to such a program is the fear that addicts will obtain more drugs than
they need and peddle the surplus. Addicts who did so could, of course,
be punished severely, and the sanctions would almost certainly be more
effective where the addict is not already a criminal by virtue of his
addiction. Moreover, effective supervision could in all likelihood limit
the dosage to the individual need. 0 In any case, the possibility that
some addicts might cheat must be set against the advantages to law
enforcement of close and regular contact with the addict population
and the denial to the illicit drug merchants of the bulk of their market.
Thus, if there is any social cost to such a program, it would be nominal.
Its benefit would be the virtual elimination of the criminality resulting
from addiction. 0 Therefore, even if it is not unconstitutional for the
CRIMINAL CODE, THE CAUSES, TREATMENT, AND REHABILITATION OF DRUG ADDICTS, S. REI'.
No. 1850, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955).
See also Ausubel, Controversial Issues in the Management of Drug Addiction: Legisla-
tion, Ambulatory Treatment, and the British System, 44 MENTAL HYGIENE 535 (1960), In
J. O'DONNELL & J. BALL, supra note 12, at 195. Ausubel characterizes the British system,
under which addicts may receive narcotics by prescription as "the epitome of amoral
expediency." His moral solution is compulsory civil commitment for as long as necessary.
"Truly incurable addicts," he says, "are less dangerous to society when incarcerated for life
on narcotic farms ..... J. O'DONNE.L & J. BALL at 203.
79. Proposals to supply addicts with narcotics have not enjoyed a dispassionate public
hearing. The conclusive argument against them has in practice been the supposed failure
of the clinics established for such purposes between 1919 and 1923 in the wake of the
Harrison Act. That these clinics "failed" is very much in dispute, since there are also claims
for them of great success, and since "there is a complete lack of any objective criteria of
success or failure." American Medical Association, Narcotics Addiction: Official Actions of
the American Medical Association (1963), in J. O'DONNELL & J. BALL, supra note 12,
at 182. It does appear, however, that some free drugs thus provided were diverted
to illicit use. But this proves very little. The clinics were hastily organized, understaffed,
and loosely supervised. Id. at 181; see also Ploscowe, supra note 13, at 101. Moral indigna-
tion at the whole idea of sustaining doses appears to have played a large part In the
original A.M.A. opposition which led to their abandonment. See American Medical As-
sociation, supra, at 186-87. For an excellent discussion of the experience of the clinics and
its contemporary relevance, see A. LINDESNUTH, THE ADDICr AND THlE LAW 135.61 (1965).
The whole problem of diversion of the drugs supplied could of course be simply
eliminated if clinic doctors administered the drugs themselves. The expense of such a
system would be considerably less than that of the new commitment programs, Its dis-
advantage is that addicts would be obliged to come to the clinic several times daily, which
might interfere with their gainful employment. But this hardship for the addict Is scarcely
comparable to that inflicted by civil commitment, and if he finds It excessive, he could
commit himself for treatment voluntarily.
Moreover, even if he were given instead a daily supply, lie would plainly be likely to
peddle only the excess over what he himself needed. It is doubtful that addicts could
persuade alert doctors who see them daily into providing doses much larger than their
need, even if-due to the phenomenon of tolerance-their need is not static. If this Is In
fact an insuperable difficulty, surely the burden of proof rests on the state to show that that
is so, since only a compelling public need could legitimate the present practice of creating
and then punishing criminality.
80. This approach has been specifically endorsed by the New York Academy of
Medicine. See Committee on PubliC Health, Subcommittee on Drug Addiction, Report on
Drug Addiction, 31 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. OF MED. 592 (1955), in j. O'DONNELL & J. BALL, supra
note 12, at 191., The A.B.A.-A.M.A. Joint Committee on Narcotics called for experimental
research to discover whether the administrative difficulties in such a program could be
overcome. See JOINT CoMmiTrEE OF THE AMECAN BAR AssOCiATION AND TnlE AmERICAN
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state to deny addicts all legal access to narcotics, the state should
certainly be estopped from confining addicts for fear of the crimes it
obliges them to commit.
But were the state's causal responsibility irrelevant, commitment
to prevent violations of the narcotics laws would still be invalid
simply because the remedy is disproportionate to the harm. It would
not be contended that the state has the right to commit a person for any
prolonged period because he suffers from chronic head cold, even
though it is virtually certain that some persons will catch colds from
him. Some criminal offenses, like some minor contagious diseases,
represent harm to others so impalpable, insubstantial, or indirect that
it cannot outweigh a man's liberty.
Even if the state has the right to imprison for violation of the narcotic
laws, it does not follow that it has the right to confine any person solely
in order to prevent such violations. Punishment responds to the cul-
pable infraction of the law as well as to the harmful consequences the
law was designed to prevent. Preventive detention, on the other hand,
poses directly the conflict of values between liberty and the harm to be
prevented. In that balance, the harm must be a demonstrable injury to
some person or persons, or perhaps to property, if it is to support a
prolonged confinement."' The only consequence of individual viola-
AMDicAL AssocuToN (Final Report), supra note 13, at 161. They emphasized too that the
American practice of denying drugs to addicts represents a minority approach. See also
King, An Appraisal of International, British and Selected European Narcotic Drug Laws,
Regulations and Policies, id. at 121ff. On the British experience, see generally id.; see also
E. ScHUR, NARcorC ADDICrIoN IN BRITAIN AND AMEIucrA (1962). The British have recently
tightened government supervision of prescriptions to addicts, which were previously left
largely to the discretion of private doctors.
See also Lindesmith, Introduction to JoIr Co~t~rrrTE oF TUm AMmmEz,N ZArt AsscA-
TION AND THE A smcAN M.DicAL AssoCATION (Final Report), supra note 13, at :Xii-mv:
For several years most Americans, assuming that American methods of handling
addicts were standard practice have regarded suggestions that addicts be given access
to legal drugs as a startling, radical, or dangerous idea. At the same time it has
apparently seemed quite normal and acceptable to them that alcohol and barbiturate
addicts obtain their supplies legally without police interference, despite the fact that
the alcohol and barbiturate habits are probably at least as harmful and more prevalent
than is addiction to heroin or morphine .... []n reality it is the European practices
which are standard rather than the American.
In support of supplying drugs to addicts see Howe, An Alternative Solution to the
Narcotics Problem, 22 LAiw & CoN-miP. PRoB. 132 (1957); A. LsDESm r, TiE ADDICr
AND TiE LAW (1965), especially ch. 5 at 135-161 and ch. 10 at 269-302.
81. Insofar as they have considered it, the courts have not seen the question in this
light. They have made no distinction between what conduct merits punishment and
what warrants anticpatory confinement.
It is enough if there is competent evidence that [a man] may commit an), criminal act,
for any such act will injure others and will expose the person to arrest, trial, and
conviction.
Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1960). For good measure, the court
threw in what is either a novel paternalistic argument or else a highly novel concept of
dangerousness:
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tions of the narcotic laws is a possible remote contribution to the
addiction of some other person; and such indirect and wholly specula-
tive harm cannot be grounds for commitment.
82
In sum, addiction by itself meets the burden of proof for preventive
detention only with regard to violations of the narcotic prohibition
laws; and the danger of such violations is not a sufficient ground for
commitment. Addiction together with poverty may make a case for
confinement of many, but not all, addicts because of the danger of
theft offenses. But liberty may well outweigh this threat to property as
well. 83 The state may be required to wait until the addict steals before
it confines him, and to set him free when his sentence has run.81
Needless to say, when it does punish an addict for any offense, nothing
prevents the state from doing all it can to cure him of his dangerousness
by attempting to cure him of his addiction while he is under sentence.
There remains one final question. If a brief confinement could cure
a compulsive offender of his compulsion to offend, civil commitment
might then be permissible to prevent relatively trivial offenses, and
perhaps the burden of proof might be relaxed. The reason is not, of
course, that treatment might benefit the individual, but rather that the
There is always the additional possible danger-not to be discounted even if remote
-that a nonviolent criminal act may expose the perpetrator to violent retaliatory acts
by the victim of the crime. Id.
See also Carras v. District of Columbia, 183 A.2d 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
82. As a practical matter, the liberty which is thus protected against preventive deten.
tion is a poor and ephemeral thing as long as the addict is subject to severe prison
sentences for purchasing, possessing, or using narcotics. It is in effect the liberty to escape
detection. But the certainty that the addict will break the law also calls in question the
legitimacy of punishing addicts for such offenses under traditional principles of mens rea.
Cf. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and Driver v. Hinnant, 356
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), holding that an alcoholic cannot be punished for public appear-
ances while intoxicated which he makes under compulsion of his disease. But the courts
have refused to grant addicts a defense of "pharmacological duress" to prosecution for use
or possession. Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
929 (1965). They have also refused to apply the rationale of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962), on which the Driver and Easter cases also relied, to narcotics offenses committed
by drug addicts, at least in part because the Robinson Court expressly refused to do so.
See Hutcheson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 977, 977 n.26 (D.C. Cir.) (opinion of Bazelon,
J.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965).
83. Liberty ordinarily outweighs property in the scales of due process. As long as the
state may punish for thefts committed under the duress of need for drugs (and 'as long
as" is likely to be for very long indeed), the total risk to property is not excessive. If addicts
could not be imprisoned, and the risk were therefore of an infinite number of thefts, the
case might well be different. At some point, surely, the social interest in preservation of
property rights is more important than a sick man's liberty.
84. By punishing an addict when he steals under compulsion of his disease, the state
treats him as though he were capable of refraining from theft: if he were conceded to be
incapable of doing so, punishment would be manifestly inappropriate. The law should
raise the same presumption of responsibility when the issue is detention to prevent such
thefts: if the addict is presumed to have some control over his actions, then it cannot be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he will steal, and he may not be preventively
detained.
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deprivation of liberty is more nearly comparable to a quarantine. If
the chronic common cold could be permanently cured by a week in a
solarium, the social benefit would probably be worth the cost in liberty
and sunburn. The prevention of an infinite number of minor infrac-
tions might well be thought to permit some strictly limited loss of
liberty where it would not justify more. But this theoretical possibility
is academic in the case of narcotic addicts. The cure for addiction, if it
comes, will not come quickly; and the chances are it will not come at
all.
Conclusion
If they are applied as written, New York and California addict-com-
mitment programs are almost certainly unconstitutional. They permit
commitment of doctors and other mentally competent addicts who pose
no threat to the safety or welfare of others. Since any private citizen
may initiate a commitment proceeding, and since the courts have no
discretion to refuse commitment of any one found to be an addict, there
is a real danger that such persons will actually be committed. Moreover,
there are also serious questions about the validity of commitment of the
mass of lower-class addicts at whom the statutes were primarily directed.
Many of these persons are both dangerous to others and much in need
of help. But there are other remedies for their dangerousness, and the
case for helping them against their will would be stronger if either the
chances of success or the probable conditions of their subsequent life
were better than they are.
On the other hand, many addicts are plainly proper subjects for
commitment. But since addiction alone never justifies commitment,
each addict must be given a hearing to determine whether the state has
the right to commit him against his will. The state must show either
that he is clearly incompetent to decide for himself whether to accept
institutional treatment, or that he will beyond a reasonable doubt cause
substantial harm to others unless he is confined. The fact of addiction
is good but not conclusive evidence of the former proposition; it is
weak evidence of the latter, and it would be virtually no evidence at all
if addicts could legally obtain the drugs they require.
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